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Abstract
In this paper we propose a tractable model of behavior in threshold public
good games. The model is based on learning direction theory. We find that
individual behavior is consistent with the predictions of the model. Moreover,
the model is able to accurately predict the success rate of groups in providing
the public good. We apply this to give novel insight on the assurance problem
by showing that the problem (of coordinating on the inefficient equilibrium of
no contributions) is only likely with a relatively low endowment. In developing
the model we compare and contrast best reply learning and impulse balance
theory. Our results suggest that best reply learning provides a marginally
better fit with the data.
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1 Introduction
A threshold public good is a public good that is provided if and only if total contri-
butions towards its provision reach some critical threshold. Many goods and services
can be approximated as threshold public goods (Taylor and Ward, 1982; Andreoni,
1998; van Lange et al., 2013; Mak et al., 2015; Hudik and Chovanculiak, 2017; Iris
et al., 2019). A fundamental question is whether such goods are provided at the
Pareto efficient level. Experimental evidence suggests they are not. In particular,
the observed success rates of providing threshold public goods (when the choice set
is continuous) are usually in the range of 30 to 70 percent (e.g. Croson and Marks,
2000; Cadsby et al., 2008; Alberti and Cartwright, 2015).1 Such inefficiency has been
observed in many different settings and is a robust empirical result. What is lacking
is a theoretical model that can explain it.
The approach we take in this paper is based on learning direction theory. The
theory says that players will have a tendency to change their behavior in a way that
is consistent with ex-post rationality (Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Selten, 1998, 2004;
see also Cason and Friedman, 1997, 1999). It, thus, encapsulates a general notion
of adaptive learning in which players adjust behavior based on the last iteration of
play. We apply learning direction theory to threshold public good games and derive
two testable hypotheses. These hypotheses detail ‘experience conditions’ in which we
would expect players to increase their contribution, to decrease their contribution,
or to leave their contribution unchanged. We also show that predictions are sensi-
tive to whether or not there is a refund. In particular, we analyse individual level
data from experiments reported in Alberti and Cartwright (2015) and Cartwright
and Stepanova (2015) to test our hypotheses. We find strong support for learning
direction theory.
Learning direction theory does not, of itself, allow us to model and predict success
rates in providing the public good. To go this extra step we compare and contrast two
alternative ways of modelling ex-post rationality - best reply and impulse balance.
1It has been shown that various institutions such as sanctions (Andreoni and Gee, 2015), mem-
bership fee (Bchir and Willinger, 2013), refund bonus (Cason and Zubrickas, 2015) or requirement
for full agreement (Alberti and Cartwright, 2016) can increase efficiency above the ‘baseline’ level.
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Best reply learning posits that players will change their contribution in proportion
to the gap between their last contribution and that which was ex-post optimal (Fu-
denberg and Levine, 1998). For instance, if a player contributes $20 but can see it
would have been optimal to contribute $30 then she will increase her contribution in
proportion to the $10 gap. By contrast, impulse balance theory posits that players
will change their contribution in proportion to ex-post impulse where impulse is mea-
sured by foregone profit (Selten, 2004; Ockenfels and Selten, 2005, 2014; Selten and
Chmura, 2008; Chmura et al., 2012). For instance, suppose in our previous example
that by contributing $30 the player would have increased her payoff by $50. Then
she will increase her contribution in proportion to the $50 foregone payoff.
We show that the predictions of best reply learning and impulse balance theory
diverge in the case where contributions fall ‘just short’ of the threshold. Best reply
learning posits that a player will have a tendency to increase her contribution a ‘little
bit’ because there was only a small shortfall. By contrast, impulse balance theory
posits that she will have a tendency to increase her contribution a lot because there
is a large payoff gain from reaching the threshold. This prediction is consistent with
the psychology literature on counter-factual thinking (e.g. De Cremer and van Dijk,
2010; Scholl and Sassenberg, 2014). It provides a way to directly compare the two
models of learning. We find that both models provide, overall, good predictions of
success rates. Best reply learning seems, however, to provide the better fit with both
individual and group level data.
Learning direction theory is particularly appealing for our purposes because it can
model deviations from Nash equilibrium (Selten and Chmura, 2008). This is cru-
cial because there is strong evidence that play in threshold public good games does
not converge to equilibrium. For instance, groups that behave consistent with Nash
equilibrium in one round of repeated interaction usually deviate from Nash equilib-
rium in subsequent rounds (e.g. Cadsby and Maynes, 1999). Theoretical analysis
of threshold public good games has to, therefore, take account of non-equilibrium
behavior. In Section 5 we show that a model based on learning direction theory
can accurately predict success rates at providing the public good. In doing so we
revisit the results of Cartwright and Stepanova (2015) looking at whether a refund
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increases success in providing the public good. We show that a refund is likely to
increase efficiency (relative to the setting of no refund) only if the endowment is very
low. This has interesting implications, as we discuss in Section 5, on the extent to
which inefficiency in threshold public good games is driven by the assurance problem
or coordination problem. Our results suggest the coordination problem is foremost.
In relating our work to that on threshold public good games we highlight that
our focus is on games with a continuous choice set.2 Such games are of wide appli-
cation and are most often used in the experimental literature. There is, however,
a distinct lack of theoretical modeling of this type of game. Instead, the theoret-
ical literature has almost exclusively focused on threshold public good games with
a binary choice set (e.g. Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984; Rapoport, 1985, 1987; Au,
Chen, and Komorita, 1998; Offerman, Sonnemans, and Schram, 2001; Makris, 2009;
Cartwright and Stepanova, 2017; Spiller and Bolle, 2017). Given that very different
issues arise with a continuous choice set, as opposed to binary choice set, (Suleiman
and Rapoport, 1992; Cadsby and Maynes, 1999) it is crucial to develop theoretical
insight specific to the continuous case.
There are two papers we know of that offer theoretical insight on threshold public
good games with a continuous choice set. First, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) show
that every perfect Nash equilibrium of a continuous threshold public good game
(with refund) results in the public good being provided.3 This prediction of a 100
percent success rate does little to explain the experimentally observed success rates
well below 100 percent. Second, Suleiman and Rapoport (1992) question whether
subjects in a threshold public good game behave consistent with expected utility
maximization or, what they call, a cooperative model. They found some support for
both models, but also found that neither model was able to predict contributions
with much accuracy.4 A new approach, therefore, is needed and in this paper we
2Strictly speaking we shall consider games where the choice set is discrete, but large.
3A related theoretical literature considers the subscription game, which is a form of threshold
public good game (e.g. Admati and Perry, 1991; Laussel and Palfrey, 2003; Barbieri and Malueg,
2008). For the class of game considered in the experimental literature (i.e. simultaneous move
games of complete information) the prediction would again be that groups efficiently provide the
public good.
4More specifically, in their experiments Suleiman and Rapoport (1992) obtained the beliefs of a
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provide an approach that appears to work well in capturing both individual and
aggregate level behavior.
We proceed as follows: In Section 2 we introduce threshold public good games.
In Section 3 we detail the predictions of learning direction theory and the main
assumption of impulse balance theory. In Section 4 we test the predictions of learning
direction theory with experimental data. In Section 5 we show how impulse balance
theory can be used to predict aggregate outcomes. In Section 6 we conclude.
2 Threshold public good games
We shall consider variations of a simultaneous move, symmetric threshold public good
game. A game is characterized by four positive integers: the number of players n, the
size of endowment E, a threshold T , and a value of the public good V . Each player
in set N = {1, ..., n} is endowed with E units of a private good. Simultaneously,
and independently of each other, players decide how much of their endowment to
contribute towards a public good. For each player i ∈ N , let xi ∈ {0, 1, ..., E} denote
the contribution of player i. Let Y =
∑n
j=1 xj denote total contributions and let
Y−i = Y − xi denote the total contribution of players other than i.
If total contributions, Y , equal or exceed the threshold T then the public good
is provided and each player receives an additional V units of private good. If total
contributions are less than the threshold then the public good is not provided. We
shall assume that if total contributions are above the threshold there is no rebate of
the excess contributions.5 If total contributions are less than the threshold then we
allow two possibilities, either (i) players get a full refund (R) of their contribution,
or, (ii) they get no refund (NR) of their contribution. In the case of a full refund
subject about the likely contributions of others. From this one can ask whether own contribution is
consistent with beliefs. They found evidence of consistency with both an expected utility model and
cooperative model. This did not, however, translate into an accurate prediction of contributions.
Also note, that such predictions rely on knowing the beliefs of subjects. To apply these models in
a general setting, therefore, one would require a model of belief formation.
5This is standard in the empirical literature, e.g. Cadsby et al. (2008). Exceptions include
Coats et al. (2009).
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the payoff function of player i ∈ N can be written
πi(xi, Y−i) =
{
E − xi + V if xi + Y−i ≥ T
E if xi + Y−i < T
.
In the case of no refund the payoff function of player i ∈ N can be written
πi(xi, Y−i) =
{
E − xi + V if xi + Y−i ≥ T
E − xi if xi + Y−i < T
.
It will be assumed that nV > T meaning that it is socially efficient to provide
the public good. It will also be assumed that nE ≥ T meaning that it is feasible for
players to provide the good.
2.1 Nash Equilibria
To provide a starting point for the analysis we describe the set of Nash equilibria.
Vector of contributions (x∗1, ..., x
∗
n) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game




−i) ≥ πi(xi, Y ∗−i) for all xi ∈ {0, 1, ..., E} and i ∈ N . There
are typically multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria in simultaneous threshold public
good games. These can be partitioned into two broad categories. There is a set
of equilibria where the sum of contributions equals the threshold and also a set of
equilibria where the sum of contributions is less than the threshold. We describe
each in turn.
It is simple to show that there will always exist a set of Nash equilibria with
public good provision where
x∗i + Y
∗
−i = T and x
∗
i ≤ V
for all i ∈ N . If min {E, V } > T/n there will be several of such equilibria. All of
the equilibria of this type yield a total payoff to players of nV − T but differ in how
this payoff is distributed amongst players. A player who contributes relatively less
receives a relatively higher payoff.
If T > min {E, V } then there will also exist a set of Nash equilibria with no public
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−i < T and T − Y ∗−i > min {E, V }
for all i ∈ N . In interpretation, the public good is not provided and it was not in
the interests of any player to contribute enough to satisfy the threshold. In this case
every player receives payoff E. In the case of no refund the set of equilibria with no
public good provision consists of only the zero vector (0, ..., 0). Given that the public
good is not provided and there is no refund, any contribution is costly.
3 Ex-post rationality
In this section we apply learning direction theory. The theory says that players
will have a tendency to adjust their behavior in accordance with ex-post rationality
(Selten and Stoeker, 1986; Selten, 1998; Selten et al., 2005). This does not mean
players will always adjust behavior in accordance with ex-post rationality; rather,
there is a tendency to do so that is stronger than would be expected from random
behavior. This allows us to make qualitative predictions on the tendency of players
to increase or decrease their contribution.
To formalize the notion of ex-post rationality, consider a vector of contributions
(x′1, ...x
′
n). Let exi denote the ex-post optimal contribution of player i, where
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the payoff player i would have got by contributing the ex-post optimal amount. We
refer to exi − x′i as the ex-post adjustment gap and eπi − π′i as the ex-post payoff
impulse. If exi > x
′
i then learning direction theory predicts a tendency for player i
to increase her contribution. Similarly, if exi < x
′
i it predicts a tendency for player i
6For now, we assume there exists a unique ex-post optimum contribution. When detailing
specific experience conditions in Section 3.1 we address instances with non-uniqueness.
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to decrease her contribution.
To make quantitative predictions on changes in contributions we need to model
the strength of tendency to change contribution. We will compare and contrast two
approaches - best reply learning and impulse balance theory. Best reply learning says
that changes in contribution will be proportional to the adjustment gap. Impulse
balance theory says that they will be proportional to the ex-post payoff impulse
(Ockenfels and Selten, 2005; Selten and Chmura, 2008). Specific predictions will,
thus, depend on the vector of contributions. We, therefore, distinguish the set of
possible ex-post outcomes or experience conditions (Selten, 1998).
3.1 Experience conditions
We distinguish seven possible experience conditions. In interpretation, these classify
possible outcomes of a game, as given by a vector of contributions (x1, ...xn), into
different categories. We begin by defining the experience conditions for the case of
no refund. The conditions are defined for any player i ∈ N . To help to understand
the conditions we highlight that xi + Y−i is the total contribution and T − Y−i is the
amount player i would have needed to contribute to provide the public good. As you
work through the conditions it may be useful to refer to Figure 1 which illustrates
the conditions for the case where E > V and n = 5.7 On the horizontal axis we
measure player i’s own contribution and on the vertical axis we measure the sum of
contributions by the four other players Y−i.
Lost opportunity (LO). Total contributions were less than the threshold and the
player would have done better to contribute the amount needed to just achieve the
threshold. Formally, xi and Y−i satisfy,
xi + Y−i < T and T − Y−i ≤ min {E, V } . (LO)
The first condition says that the public good was not provided. The second condition
7These figure correspond to the High NR Treatment in our experiment, to be discussed in Section
4.
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Figure 1: The seven experience conditions when E > V and n = 5.
says that it could have been provided if player i had contributed more and that player
i’s payoff would have been higher by doing so.8 The optimal ex-post contribution is
T − Y−i and the ex-post payoff impulse is xi + V − (T − Yi).
Wasted contribution (WC ). Total contributions were less than the threshold and the
player would have done better to contribute less. Formally, xi and Y−i satisfy,
xi + Y−i < T and xi > 0 and T − Y−i > min {E, V } . (WC)
The first condition says that the public good is not provided. The third condition
says that the player either could not have done enough on her own to provide the
good or would not have had an incentive to do so. The optimal ex-post contribution
8If T − Y−i = V the player is indifferent between contributing 0 or contributing T − Y−i. So,
this can be seen as either the lost opportunity or wasted contribution experience condition. For
simplicity, we shall treat it as the lost opportunity experience condition. This was very rare in the
experimental data and so is not significant for our results.
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is 0 and the ex-post payoff impulse is xi.
Spot on contribution (SO). Total contributions are equal to the threshold and the
player benefits from the public good. Formally, xi and Y−i satisfy,
xi + Y−i = T and 0 < xi ≤ V. (SO)
There is no incentive to increase or decrease the contribution.
Overcontribution (OC ). Total contributions exceed the threshold, and the player
would have done better to contribute the amount needed to just achieve the threshold.
Formally, xi and Y−i satisfy,
xi + Y−i > T and xi > 0 and T − Y−i ≤ V. (OC)
There is an incentive to reduce the contribution. The optimal ex-post contribution is
T−Y−i if Y−i < T or 0 if Y−i ≥ T . The ex-post payoff impulse is min{xi, xi+Y−i−T}.
Excessive contribution (EC ). Total contributions exceed the threshold, but the player
does not, and cannot, benefit from the public good. Formally, xi and Y−i satisfy,
xi + Y−i ≥ T and T − Y−i > V. (EC)
There is an incentive to reduce the contribution. The optimal ex-post contribution
is 0 and the ex-post payoff impulse is xi − V .
Zero contribution (ZY, ZN ). If the player contributes 0 and could not have increased
her payoff by contributing more then there is no incentive to change her contribution.
We distinguish whether the public good is provided or not (zero yes and zero no).
Formally, xi and Y−i satisfy,
xi = 0 and Y−i ≥ T , xi = 0 and T − Y−i > min {E, V } . (1)
In the case of a full refund we distinguish the same seven possible ex-post experi-
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Table 1: The ex-post optimum, exi, the absolute value of adjustment gap, |exi − xi|,





Contribution (exi) Gap (|exi − xi|) Dir. Strength (eπi − πi)
LO (NR) T − Y−i T − Y−i − xi ↑ xi + V − T + Y−i
LO (R) T − Y−i T − Y−i − xi ↑ V − T + Y−i
WC (NR) 0 xi ↓ xi
WC (R) − − − −
SO xi 0 0 0
OC max {0, T − Y−i} min {xi, xi + Y−i − T} ↓ min {xi, xi + Y−i − T}
EC 0 xi ↓ xi − V
ZY and ZN 0 0 0 0
ZN (R) − − − −
Notes: The signs of direction are increase, ↑, decrease, ↓, ambiguous, −, no change, 0.
ence conditions but note changes to the wasted contribution and zero no conditions.
The full refund means that there is no clearly defined ex-post optimum in these two
conditions. So, there is no ex-post incentive to either increase or decrease the contri-
bution. Intuitively, one might expect an increase in contribution up to a maximum
of min {E, V }, but this is not a prediction of best reply learning or learning direction
theory. We summarize the seven experience conditions for the case of no refund and
full refund in Table 1.9
3.2 Hypotheses
Having distinguished the seven experience conditions above we now propose a set
of hypotheses that can be tested with experimental data. We begin with two hy-
potheses that state specific testable predictions of learning direction theory. The
9Different players in the same group may face different experience conditions. For example,
one player may face the lost opportunity condition while another faces the wasted contribution
condition. Similarly, one player may face the excessive contribution condition while another faces
the overcontribution condition.
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first hypothesis is a direct application of learning direction theory in saying that
players have a tendency to change contributions consistent with ex-post rationality.
It summarises the ‘Dir.’ column in Table 1.
Hypothesis 1: In the case of no or full refund a player will have a tendency to
increase her contribution in the lost opportunity experience condition and decrease
her contribution in the overcontribution and excessive contribution condition. In
the case of no refund a player will, in addition, have a tendency to decrease her
contribution in the wasted contribution condition.
Learning direction theory has previously been applied in settings where there is
always an upward or downward impulse (Selten 1998 and Selten et al. 2005). We
suggest a natural extension whereby no ex-post payoff impulse implies no tendency
to change contribution.
Hypothesis 2: In the case of no or full refund a player will have a tendency to keep
her contribution unchanged in the spot on and zero yes experience conditions and
to change her contribution in the lost opportunity, overcontribution and excessive
contribution conditions. In the case of no refund a player will, in addition, have a
tendency to keep her contribution unchanged in the zero no condition and to change
her contribution in the wasted contribution condition.
Our next two hypotheses draw on impulse balance theory and best reply learn-





contribution of player i at time r, her payoff, and the payoff that she would have
realized with the ex-post optimal amount.
Hypothesis 3 (Impulse Balance Theory): Changes in contribution tend to be pro-
portional to the strength of ex-post payoff impulse,
∣∣xr+1i − xri ∣∣ ∝ |eπri − πri | . (2)
Hypothesis 4 (Best reply Learning): Changes in contribution tend to be propor-
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tional to the adjustment gap,
∣∣xr+1i − xri ∣∣ ∝ |exri − xri | . (3)
Hypotheses 3 and 4 complement Hypothesis 1 by saying how much players will
tend to change their contribution. We can see from Table 1 that impulse balance
theory and best reply learning are indistinguishable except for the lost opportunity
and excess contribution experience conditions. The lost opportunity condition is
particularly interesting because the strength of ex-post payoff impulse is inversely
related to the ex-post adjustment gap. Hypothesis 3 predicts that players will in-
crease their contribution by more the closer are contributions to the threshold, be-
cause the impulse is stronger. This prediction is consistent with the evidence that
counter-factual thinking occurs more often in the case of a ‘near miss’ rather than
‘large miss’ (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Kahneman and Miller, 1986; De Cremer
and van Dijk, 2010).10 Hypothesis 4, by contrast, predicts that players will increase
their contribution the further are contributions from the threshold.
4 Experimental results
To evaluate our hypotheses we shall draw on data from laboratory experiments. We
use data reported in Alberti and Cartwright (2015) and Cartwright and Stepanova
(2015). We shall only provide a brief overview of the experimental procedure; for
full details see Alberti and Cartwright (2015). Subjects played the same threshold
public good game over 25 rounds using a fixed matching protocol. At the end of each
round feedback was given on own payoff, total contributions to the public good and
whether or not the public good was provided. The experiments were programmed
using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Altogether there were 8 different treatments, summarized in Table 2. The Base-
line treatment corresponds to the baseline treatment commonly used in the literature
(e.g. Croson and Marks, 2000). The High, High 2, Low and Low 2 treatments are
10See also Roese (1997) and Parks et al. (2003).
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Table 2: Summary of experimental treatments
Treatment n E V T Refund No. of subjects
Baseline 5 55 50 125 Yes 40
Baseline NR 5 55 50 125 No 40
High 5 70 50 125 Yes 30
High NR 5 70 50 125 No 45
High 2 5 55 20 50 Yes 30
Low 5 30 50 125 Yes 30
Low NR 5 30 50 125 No 45
Low 2 5 55 100 250 Yes 30
290
motivated and discussed in detail by Alberti and Cartwright (2015). The main thing
to note is that the high or low refers to a relatively high or low endowment when
compared to the threshold. The NR treatments allow insight on the consequences of
a refund (Cartwright and Stepanova, 2015). A total of 290 subjects took part in the
experiments which were run at the University of Kent.
4.1 Learning direction
We begin the analysis of the experimental data by evaluating Hypotheses 1 and 2.
At the end of each round we can work out the experience condition faced by each
subject. We also know whether a subject increased, decreased, or kept unchanged
their contribution in the subsequent round (excluding round 25). These two things
allow us to report the proportion of times subjects increased or decreased their
contribution for each experience condition, which we shall denote ρup and ρdw. We
also report the proportion of times the contribution stayed unchanged σno.
Table 3 details the number of instances of each experience condition (in the first
24 rounds), as well as ρup, ρdw and σno, aggregated across all treatments. (In the
supplementary material we provide the data broken down by treatment, where you
can see that the proportions are similar across treatments.) While the formal tests of
14




Refund treatments NR treatments
no. ρdw ρup σno no. ρdw ρup σno
LO 1009 10.4 51.1 38.5 455 16.5 48.8 34.7
WC 349 17.2 37.5 45.3 572 46.9 24.5 28.7
SO 405 11.1 15.8 73.1 279 3.2 5.7 91.0
OC 2014 38.3 12.1 49.7 1014 39.1 19.9 42.0
EC 28 53.6 7.1 39.3 26 15.4 11.5 73.1
ZY 28 − 17.9 82.1 66 − 18.2 81.8
ZN 7 − 85.7 14.3 708 − 10.0 90.0
Notes: For example, in the refund treatments, there were 1009 instances where a subject
faced the lost opportunity experience condition; in 10.4% of these instances we observed a
decrease in contribution, in 51.1% an increase, and in 38.5% no change. The proportions
in bold correspond to Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Hypothesis 1 and 2 follow immediately below, we highlight that the data summarized
in Table 3 is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. For instance, we observe that ρup >
ρdw in the lost opportunity experience condition. We also observe that ρup < ρdw in
the overcontribution and excessive contribution conditions. Moreover, ρup < ρdw in
the wasted contribution condition where there is no refund. Finally, the value of σno
is, as predicted, high in the spot on, zero no and zero yes experience conditions.
To formally evaluate Hypothesis 1 we need to take into account a possible regres-
sion effect (Ockenfels and Selten, 2005). The regression effect here is that purely by
chance a large contribution is likely to be followed by a smaller contribution and a
small contribution is likely to be followed by a larger contribution.11 We, therefore,
test Hypothesis 1 against an alternative model of random choice. This alternative
model can be explained as follows: (i) In period 1 each player randomly, and in-
11This effect is unlikely to explain the data for the wasted contribution experience condition in
the case of no refund because in this case the regression effect works in the opposite direction to that
predicted by learning direction theory. For the lost opportunity and overcontribution experience
conditions the regression effect is a possible concern.
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dependently, chooses a contribution between 0 and min{E, V }.12 (ii) In periods 2
to 25 each player independently with probability s ∈ [0, 1] leaves their contribution
unchanged and otherwise randomly choose a contribution between 0 and min{E, V }.
If s = 0 then all choice is random. The higher is s the more persistence in choice.
To explain how we evaluated Hypothesis 1 against the model of random choice
consider the lost opportunity condition. In a particular group let LOup and LOdw
denote respectively the number of times (during the 25 periods for all 5 play-
ers) we observe a subject increasing or decreasing their contribution in response
to the lost opportunity experience condition. We then look at the upward ratio
LOup/(LOup + LOdw). Learning direction theory predicts this ratio would be high.
We simulated outcomes in the model with random choice (for different values of s)
and compared our observed data to that in the random model. In Table 4 we sum-
marize by treatment the average ratio we observe (Obs), what we would expect with
the random model when s = 0.5 (Ran) and the probability the observed mean would
be so high with the random model (p). Note that this test treats the group as the
unit of observation. We performed the same exercise for the overcontribution and
wasted contribution conditions with the caveat that we are now looking at whether
the observed mean would be so low. Comprehensive details on our methods and a
robustness analysis are provided in the Supplementary Material.
You can see in Table 4 that we find strong support for Hypothesis 1. We find a
significantly higher tendency to increase contributions in the lost opportunity condi-
tion and to decrease contributions in the overcontribution condition than would be
expected with random choice. The one caveat is the Low, Low NR and Low 2 treat-
ments. The issue here, however, is that a strong upward and downward tendency is
predicted with the random model and so there is little space for observed behaviour
to be significantly different. In the wasted contribution condition a highly significant
difference is apparent in the Low NR condition.
In evaluating Hypothesis 2 we note that inertia in the random model is determined
by parameter s. We cannot, therefore, directly compare with the random model.
Instead we compare across experience conditions. Consider, first, the refund setting.
12Contributions are still forced to be integers.
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Table 4: Evaluating Hypothesis 1 compared to a model of random choice (s = 0.5).
Treatment LO OC WC
Obs Ran p Obs Ran p Obs Ran p
Baseline 0.82 0.69 0.0001 0.24 0.36 0.0001 - - -
Baseline NR 0.78 0.69 0.013 0.34 0.36 0.16 0.48 0.48 0.36
High 0.82 0.69 0.004 0.21 0.36 0.0001 - - -
High NR 0.79 0.69 0.01 0.29 0.36 0.0031 0.38 0.48 0.07
Low 0.91 0.61 0.029 0.18 0.10 0.85 - - -
Low NR 0.80 0.61 0.12 0 0.10 0.34 0.29 0.48 0.0001
High 2 0.91 0.70 0.0001 0.22 0.36 0.0001 - - -
Low 2 0.85 0.55 0.048 0.25 0.06 0.99 - - -
In a particular group let Gno denote the proportion of times (during the 25 periods
for all 5 players) we observe a subject keeping their contribution unchanged when in
the lost opportunity or overcontribution experience conditions.13 Similarly, let Bno
denote the proportion of times the contribution is unchanged in the spot on and zero
yes experience conditions. Hypothesis 2 predicts that inertia difference Bno − Gno
should be relatively high. We compared the inertia difference we observe to that
expected with a model of random choice. In the no refund condition we also take
account of the wasted contribution and zero no experience conditions.
In Table 5 we detail the average inertia difference by treatment. We also detail
the probability the average is this level or higher with the random model (for three
different values of s). Full details on the procedure and results are contained in
the supplementary material. While the results are somewhat sensitive to the value
of s and treatment, you can see that we find broad support for Hypothesis 2. In
particular, the inertia difference is consistently well above zero implying that subjects
were more likely to keep contributions unchanged in the spot on, zero yes, and where
relevant zero no, experience conditions than in the lost opportunity, overcontribution
13That is, Gno = (LOno +OCno)/(LOobs +OCobs) where LOno and OCno is the number of time
during the 25 periods for all 5 players we observe a subject in the LO and OC experience condition
keeping their contribution unchanged and LOobs and OCobs denotes the number of times experience
condition LO and OC occurred.
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Table 5: Evaluating Hypothesis 2 compared to a model of random choice.
Treatment Bno −Gno ps=0 ps=0.25 ps=0.5
Baseline 0.13 0.008 0.106 0.076
Baseline NR 0.25 0.0001 0.061 0.087
High 0.42 0.0001 0.007 0.002
High NR 0.17 0.0001 0.23 0.48
Low 0.16 0.020 0.073 0.064
Low NR 0.32 0.0001 0.002 0.003
High 2 0.53 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Low 2 0.34 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
and, where relevant wasted contribution, experience conditions.
4.2 Strength of impulse
We turn now to Hypotheses 3 and 4. In Table 6 we report the results of mixed
effects regressions in which we regress the change in a subject’s contribution against
the strength of ex-post impulse or adjustment gap. We, thus, compare impulse
balance theory (IBT) and best reply learning (BR). In the treatments with a full
refund the impulse in the wasted contribution experience condition is undefined. For
comparison purposes, we regress against the contribution (which equals the size of
impulse there would have been if there was no refund). The results reported in
Table 6 reaffirm evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. In particular, we observe an
increase in contributions in the lost opportunity experience condition and a decrease
in contributions in the overcontribution, excess contribution and, in the no refund
treatments, wasted contribution experience conditions. Note also that, with the
only exception of the Low treatment with refund, the results are not different across
treatments both with a full refund and no refund.
Recall that the ex-post impulse and ex-post adjustment are equivalent in the
wasted contribution and overcontribution experience conditions. Moreover, the ex-
cess contribution condition is relatively rare. Attention, therefore, in comparing
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Table 6: Mixed-effects regression results with the change of contribution as dependent
variable. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
Variable Refund Refund No refund No refund



















Low 0.740 1.366** -0.740 -0.0128
(0.532) (0.568) (0.825) (0.809)
High 0.366 0.383 -0.577 -0.364
(0.531) (0.563) (0.818) (0.803)
Low 2 -0.246 0.678
(0.532) (0.569)
High 2 -0.134 0.299
(0.533) (0.567)
Constant 0.531 -0.0582 2.651*** 1.756***
(0.368) (0.392) (0.621) (0.607)
Observations 3,840 3,840 3,120 3,120
Number of groups 32 32 26 26
AIC 24668.36 24548.13 22542.56 22445.32
BIC 24743.40 24623.17 22603.02 22505.78
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Hypotheses 3 and 4, falls on the lost opportunity condition where impulse balance
and best reply make very different predictions. Impulse balance theory suggests con-
tributions change in proportion to ex-post impulse while best reply suggests they
change in proportion to ex-post adjustment. The results in Table 6 lend support
to best reply learning (Hypothesis 4) over impulse balance theory (Hypothesis 3).
There are two pieces of evidence to support this view. First, the LO × Adjustment
coefficient is highly significant and similar to the OC × Adjustment coefficient in
both the refund and no refund setting. By contrast, the LO × Impulse coefficient is
smaller and not significant in the setting of no refund. Second, we can look at the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). A
lower number indicates better fit and you can see that the AIC and BIC are slightly
lower in both the refund and no refund setting for the model based on best reply
learning. Our results, thus, support best reply learning over impulse balance theory,
even if the difference is relatively marginal.
5 Simulations
In the preceding section we have shown that individual behavior is consistent with
the predictions of learning direction theory. In this section we demonstrate that this
can be used to predict aggregate outcomes and in particular to predict the success
rate in providing the public good. As we highlighted in the introduction, to predict
success rates is a crucial objective of our work because there is no model in the
existing literature that comes close to predicting empirically observed success rates.
To focus the analysis we shall pay attention to the assurance problem of how to avoid
‘coordination’ on the inefficient Nash equilibrium of zero contributions (Isaac et al.,
1989). A refund should alleviate the assurance problem because it directly lowers
the cost of being short of the threshold and indirectly increases confidence others
will contribute (Isaac et al., 1989; Coats et al., 2009; see also Rapoport, 1987, and
Bchir and Willinger, 2013, for an alternative approach). The comparison between a
setting with and without a refund is, therefore, of particular interest.
In order to predict outcomes we simulate contributions over time. For complete-
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ness we introduce and discuss in turn one model based on best reply learning and
one on impulse balance theory. Let xri denote the contribution of player i in round
r. The simulation method for best reply learning can be described as follows: (1)
Individual contributions in the first period are independently determined for each
player according to a normal distribution centered on T/n with standard deviation
σ.14 (2) In subsequent rounds any player with an ex-post adjustment gap of size
∆BR changes their contribution by β∆BR where β > 0 is a parameter. Note that
∆BR can be positive (resulting in an increased contribution) or negative (resulting in
a decreased contribution). In other words, xr+1i = min{xri + β∆BR, E} if ∆BR > 0
and xr+1i = max{xri + β∆BR, 0} if ∆BR < 0. (3) Any player with no impulse leaves
their contribution unchanged.
This simulation method encapsulates Hypothesis 4 in a very simplistic way. We
would argue, however, that the simplicity of the method is a virtue in that we
are not imposing any assumptions on contributions other than that suggested by
Hypothesis 4. If this suffices to reliably predict the probability of the public good
being provided then we have a method that can easily be applied and extended. The
model has two free parameters, σ and β, that we discuss in turn. Values for β can be
obtained from the coefficients in Table 6. The results we report here are obtained with
β = 0.25, to approximately fit coefficients in the LO, WC and OC conditions. In the
supplementary material we show that our results remain unchanged for alternative
values of β.15
The value of σ influences the initial contribution profile and so can clearly be crit-
ical in determining the subsequent dynamics. Our choice of a distribution centered
on T/n has two appealing properties. First, T/n is a focal contribution in threshold
public good games (Isaac et al., 1989; Alberti and Cartwright, 2016). Indeed, the
14Contributions are rounded to the nearest integer and capped at 0 and E.
15There are critical values of β that do significantly affect dynamics. To illustrate, suppose
contributions are in excess of the threshold and so all players experience the overcontribution
condition. The downward adjustment in this case is proportional to the overcontribution. That
means that if nβ ≤ 1 contributions will smoothly converge to the threshold. By contrast, if nβ > 1
contributions will overshoot. The coefficients in Table 6 and the prior experimental evidence,
however, strongly suggest that overshooting is likely to occur. Within the range nβ > 1 results are
insensitive to changes in β.
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median and modal choice in the first round was T/n in all of the 8 treatments we are
studying here (with the exception of the median being 20 in the Low treatment). A
second advantage of using a normal distribution centered on T/n is that it means the
probability of providing the public good in the first round must be approximately
50 percent.16 This would seem a very neutral starting point and one that allows the
learning dynamics to determine outcomes. The results we report are obtained with
σ = 6. Again the supplementary material tests the robustness of this assumption.
Figure 2 plots the cumulative distribution of choices we observed in the first round
(in each treatment) compared to that with the fitted distribution when σ = 6. You
can see that the fit is a reasonable approximation.
The simulation method we propose for impulse balance theory differs to that
described for best reply learning in terms of step (2). We assume a potential asym-
metry between upward and downward impulse. (2a) Any player with an upward
ex-post impulse of size ∆IB increases their contribution by α∆IB where α > 0 is
a parameter. In other words, xr+1i = min{xri + α∆IB, E}. (2b) Any player with
a downward ex-post impulse of size ∆IB decreases their contribution by γ∆IB. So,
xr+1i = max{xri − γ∆IB, 0}. A potential asymmetry between upward and downward
impulse is considered in prior work (e.g. Selten and Chmura, 2008; Cartwright and
Stepanova, 2017). It also seems consistent with the coefficients in Table 6. We report
here results obtained with α = 0.05 and γ = 0.25.
To test the model we analyse the relationship between success rates, endowment
and refund. Cartwright and Stepanova (2015) argue that the assurance problem is
exasperated when the endowment, ceteris paribus, falls below a certain level. To
be more specific, define the endowment multiple as EM = En/T . A review of
the available experimental evidence suggested that a refund makes no difference
to success rates in providing the public good if EM > 2 but does if EM < 1.3
(where success rate is the proportion of times the public good is provided). The
gap between 1.3 and 2 exists for the simple reason that no experiments have been
run with parameters in this range. To appreciate the issue consider the left hand
16It will not be exactly 50%, depending on the treatment, because of the need to constrain
contributions within [0, E].
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Figure 2: Distribution of choices in the first round compared to a fitted normal.
side of Table 7 in which we report the observed results from the Baseline, High and
Low treatments. In the High and Baseline treatments (with an EM of 2.8 and 2.2
respectively) the success rate is essentially the same with and without the refund.
But in the Low treatment (with an EM of 1.2) the success rate drops significantly
with no refund.
On the right hand side of Table 7 we detail the predicted success rates based
on our models for best reply learning and impulse balance theory. These report the
average number of times the public good was provided over 25 rounds and so replicate
our experimental data. As you can see the predicted success rates are a reasonable
fit with the data and, crucially, pick up that the refund only makes a significant
difference in the Low treatments. We also see that best reply learning provides a
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Table 7: Observed success rates (%) comparing treatments with and without a refund
and predicted success rates (setting β = 0.25, α = 0.05, γ = 0.25, σ = 6).
Treatment EM Observed Best Reply Impulse Balance
R NR Diff R NR Diff R NR Diff
High 2.8 65 61 4 59 59 0 84 70 14
Baseline 2.2 55 50 5 59 59 0 84 70 14
Low 1.2 61 16 45 57 26 31 71 36 35
better fit than impulse balance. In Figure 3 we plot the predicted difference in success
rates due to the refund for the full range of E. Our results suggest a refund makes
a significant difference if E ≤ 40 which would equate to EM ≤ 1.6. Clearly, the
number 1.6 should not be treated as definitive, but our analysis demonstrates the
potential for learning direction theory to capture observed experimental results and
make novel predictions. In this instance, our results would suggest that the assurance
problem occurs only if the endowment is very low relative to the threshold.
6 Conclusion
Threshold public good games are of wide practical interest and the subject of a large
empirical literature. This literature has shown that groups are inefficient at providing
public goods, with success rates typically varying between 30 and 70 percent (when
the choice set is continuous). Up to this point, there was no theoretical model
that could make sense of these empirical findings. In this paper we apply learning
direction theory and show that it is consistent with observed individual behavior. We
also show that a model based on best reply learning can be used to reliably predict
aggregate success rates in providing the public good. We would argue that this
is a fundamentally important step forward in our ability to model and understand
threshold public good games.
As mentioned, our approach applies learning direction theory in saying that play-
ers will tend to change their contribution in accordance with ex-post rationality (Sel-
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Figure 3: Predicted difference in success rates due to a refund as a function of E.
Experimentally observed difference in the Low, Baseline and High treatments.
ten, 2004). We compared two models of learning consistent with learning direction
theory - best reply and impulse balance. Our results suggest that best reply learn-
ing provides a better fit with both individual level and group level data. This ‘win’
for best reply learning is, though, relatively marginal and so further work would be
desirable to explore this issue. Indeed, it may be that some players react to the
adjustment gap (best reply learning) while some may react to foregone profit (im-
pulse balance). We would, thus, see heterogeneity in learning. Exploration of this
possibility would require more detailed individual level data in the lost opportunity
experience condition.
In this paper we applied our model to study whether a refund enhances efficiency.
Our results suggest that a refund only enhances efficiency if the endowment is very
low. Thus, a refund is unlikely to be an effective way of increasing success in providing
threshold public goods, and other mechanisms or institutions are needed (Cartwright
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and Stepanova, 2015). There are many other avenues that could be explored with
the model. These include the effect that changes in the threshold for public good
provision have on success in providing the public good (Isaac et al., 1989). Also, the
effect of a rebate on contributions in excess of the threshold (Marks and Croson 1998;
Spencer et al., 2009). An additional avenue of research could be changes in the size of
strategy set. In particular, to bridge the gap between studies with a binary strategy
set (contribute or not) and those with a large, essentially continuous, strategy set
(Suleiman and Rapoport, 1992).
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1 Change of contribution by treatment
Table 1: Change of contribution in the Baseline and the Baseline NR treatments




no. ρdw ρup σno no. ρdw ρup σno
LO 385 12.5 50.4 37.1 201 17.4 49.8 32.8
WC 49 30.6 40.8 28.6 172 45.3 29.1 25.6
SO 105 13.3 15.2 72.4 21 14.3 38.1 47.6
OC 401 48.1 15.5 36.4 432 36.1 20.6 43.3
EC 7 42.9 0.0 57.1 4 25.0 0.0 75.0
ZY 12 − 33.3 66.7 23 − 26.1 73.9
ZN 1 − 100.0 0.0 107 − 8.4 91.6




High High NR High 2
no. ρdw ρup σno no. ρdw ρup σno no. ρdw ρup σno
LO 220 12.3 45.9 41.8 225 16.0 48.9 35.1 188 5.3 41.1 43.6
WC 34 20.6 47.1 32.4 57 61.4 24.6 14.0 12 33.3 58.3 8.3
SO 30 6.7 10.0 83.3 98 6.1 8.2 85.7 80 16.3 16.3 67.5
OC 403 33.7 10.2 56.1 567 39.5 19.9 40.6 435 41.1 14.7 44.1
EC 21 57.1 9.5 33.3 22 13.6 13.6 72.7 0 − − −
ZY 11 − 9.1 90.9 43 − 14.0 86.0 5 − 0.0 100.0
ZN 1 − 100.0 0.0 68 − 8.8 91.2 0 − − −
2




Low Low NR Low 2
no. ρdw ρup σno no. ρdw ρup σno no. ρdw ρup σno
LO 123 8.9 61.8 29.3 29 13.8 41.4 44.8 93 9.7 52.7 37.6
WC 159 14.5 40.3 45.3 343 45.2 22.2 32.7 85 11.6 25.3 63.2
SO 35 2.9 20.0 77.1 160 0.0 0.0 100 155 9.7 16.1 74.2
OC 400 36.8 8.5 54.8 15 40.0 0.0 60.0 375 30.9 11.2 57.9
ZY 0 − − − 0 − − − 0 − − −
ZN 3 − 66.7 33.3 533 − 10.5 89.5 2 − 100.0 0.0
2 Testing Hypothesis 1
2.1 Lost opportunity experience condition
In Figure 1 we plot the cumulative distribution of upward ratio, LOup/(LOup+LOdw),
obtained with a model of random choice in the Baseline and High treatments. Given
that min(E, V ) is the same in all four treatments the model of random choice gives
identical predictions. We plot the distribution of the random model for s = 0 and 0.5
to provide an upper and lower ‘bound’. As you can see, the results are not sensitive
to changes in s. You can also see that the upward ratio is predicted to be around
0.6 to 0.8 illustrating the regression effect. In particular, purely by chance we would
expect an upward trend in the lost opportunity condition.
In Figure 1 we also plot the observed outcomes in the groups in the experiment
data together with a 95% confidence interval (for s = 0). You can see that several
groups have an upward tendency that is unlikely with random choice. To explain
the statistical test we report in the paper consider the Baseline treatment. Here we
have 8 groups and the mean upward ratio in those 8 groups is 0.82. We bootstrap
the probability that with 8 groups the mean upward ratio would be 0.82 or above.
For both s = 0, 0.5 the probability is p < 0.0001. Hence it is statistically unlikely we
would observe such a high upward ratio with random choice. We perform a similar
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exercise of the other 7 treatments.
Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of upward ratio in the Baseline, Baseline NR,
High, and High NR treatments with a random choice model and lost opportunity
experience condition. The observed outcomes in experimental groups.
For completeness, in Figure 2 we provide the corresponding plot for the Low,
Low NR, Low 2 and High 2 treatments. In the Low treatments distinguishing a
high upward ratio is difficult because the lost opportunity condition is rare. Hence,
the random model predicts a ratio of either 0 or 1 is common because there was
only one observation of the condition. In the High 2 treatment, by contrast, the
lost opportunity condition is more common and so it is much easier to pick out a
relatively high upward ratio.
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2.2 Overcontribution experience condition
In Figure 3 we plot the cumulative distribution upward ratio, OCup/(OCup +OCdw),
obtained with a model of random choice in the Baseline and High treatments. Here
you can see the upward ratio is relatively low indicating a tendency to decrease
contribution in the overcontribution condition even with the random model. That
said, with the exception of the Baseline NR treatment the observed upward ratio
is statistically lower than would be expected with the random choice model (see
the main paper). In Figure 4 we plot the corresponding distribution for the other
four treatments. You can see that in the Low, Low NR and Low 2 treatments an
upward ratio of 0 is highly likely with random choice. This means it is not possible
to statistically distinguish observed group outcomes from the random model.
2.3 Wasted contribution experience condition
In Figure 5 we plot the cumulative distribution upward ratio, WCup/(WCup+WCdw),
obtained with a model of random choice in the Baseline and High treatments. In
Figure 6 we plot the corresponding distribution for the Low treatments. Note that
wasted contribution only has a clearly defined ex-post payoff impulse in the no refund
treatments and so the Baseline NR, High NR and Low NR treatments are the natural
focus. You can see that in the Low NR treatment the upward ratio is relatively low.
In the Baseline NR and High NR treatments we observe no clear distinction between
observed behaviour and the random model.
3 Testing Hypothesis 2
In Figure 7 we plot the cumulative distribution of inertia difference predicted by the
random choice model in the baseline and high treatments. In Figure 8 we plot the
distribution for the low treatments and in Figure 9 we compare between the Low 2
and High 2 treatments. You can see that the inertia difference in groups is nearly
always positive, consistent with Hypothesis 2. Statistical significance drops when
5
Table 4: Predictions of the best reply model as a function of σ and β. In the main
paper we report the results for σ = 6 and β = 0.25.
σ 6 6 6 6 6
β 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
Baseline NR 59 60 59 59 52
Baseline 59 60 59 59 52
Baseline diff. 0 0 0 0 0
Low NR 37 29 26 13 9
Low 40 44 57 55 53
Low diff. 3 15 31 41 44
Table 5: Predictions of the best reply model as a function of σ and β. In the main
paper we report the results for σ = 6 and β = 0.25.
σ 3 6 10
β 0.25 0.25 0.25
Baseline NR 60 59 55
Baseline 60 59 58
Baseline diff. 0 0 3
Low NR 30 26 11
Low 58 57 42
Low diff. 27 31 31
s = 0.5 only because this adds an element of noise to the random model and so
makes a positive inertia difference more likely.
4 Robustness of simulation results
Our simulation results for best reply learning are based on σ = 6 and β = 0.25. In
Tables 4 and 5 we provide a sensitivity analysis to changes in σ and β. As you can
see our results are robust. Only if β drops as low as 0.15 we see a notable change
in the efficiency consequences of a refund. We remind, however, that our analysis in
the main paper suggests that β is well above 0.15.
Our simulation results for impulse balance theory are based on α = 0.05, γ = 0.25
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and σ = 6. In Tables 6 and 7 we provide a sensitivity analysis to changes in the
parameters. Here you can see more variation in predictions than in the best reply
model. Moreover, the predictions fit less well with observed success rates because
they consistently overestimate success. Even so, we do observe relative consistency
in predicting the efficiency consequences of a refund.
Table 6: Predictions of the impulse balance mode as a function of α, γ and σ. In the
main paper we report the results for α = 0.05, γ = 0.25 and σ = 6.
σ 6 6 6 6 6
α 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.05
γ 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.35
Baseline NR 73 70 60 90 56
Baseline 66 84 85 90 74
Baseline diff. -7 14 25 0 18
Low NR 29 36 32 50 8
Low 63 71 75 75 58
Low diff. 34 35 43 25 50
Table 7: Predictions of the impulse balance model as a function of α, γ and σ. In
the main paper we report the results for α = 0.05, γ = 0.25 and σ = 6.
σ 3 6 10
α 0.05 0.05 0.05
γ 0.25 0.25 0.25
Baseline NR 74 70 60
Baseline 78 84 79
Baseline diff. 5 14 19
Low NR 54 36 19
Low 78 71 61
Low diff. 24 35 41
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(a) Low, Low NR
(b) Low 2
(c) High 2
Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of upward ratio in the Low, Low NR, Low 2
and High 2 treatments with a random choice model and lost opportunity experience
condition. The observed outcomes in experimental groups.
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of upward ratio in the Baseline, Baseline NR,
High, and High NR treatments with a random choice model and overcontribution
condition. The observed outcomes in experimental groups.
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(a) Low, Low NR
(b) Low 2
(c) High 2
Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of upward ratio in the Low, Low NR, Low 2
and High 2 treatments with a random choice model and overcontribution experience
condition. The observed outcomes in experimental groups.
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution of upward ratio in the Baseline, Baseline NR,
High, and High NR treatments with a random choice model and wasted contribution
condition. The observed outcomes in experimental groups.
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Figure 6: Cumulative distribution of upward ratio in the Low and Low NR treatments
with a random choice model and wasted contribution experience condition. The
observed outcomes in experimental groups.
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(a) Baseline, High
(b) Baseline NR, High NR
Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of inertia difference in the Baseline and High and
Baseline NR and High NR treatments with a random choice model. The observed




Figure 8: Cumulative distribution of inertia difference in the Low and Low NR





Figure 9: Cumulative distribution of inertia difference in the Low 2 and High 2
treatments with a random model of choice. The observed outcomes in experimental
groups.
15
